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Abstract: 
This paper presents new evidence on the formation of producer prices based on a one-
time survey that was conducted on a sample of 1200 German firms in manufacturing in 
June 2004. Most of the firms have price-setting power and apply mark-up pricing. 
Indexation is negligible. Fixed nominal contracts are the most important reason for 
postponing a price adjustment. The second most likely reason is coordination failure, 
which causes more upward than downward stickiness. For every second firm both 
reasons are important. Firms can be assigned to four different groups according to an 
increasing complexity of reasons of price stickiness. 
 
Keywords:  Price rigidity, cluster analysis 
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Non-Technical Summary 
This paper presents the results of a survey among 1200 German manufacturing firms on 
the formation of their prices. The aim was to investigate why firms adjust their prices 
only with a certain delay to a change in market conditions and which rules govern their 
adjustment.  
The firms’ replies are confronted with several theories on price-setting behavior. We 
conclude that some theoretical models fit the real world better than others. Replies 
consistent with state-dependent models are frequent, whereas time-dependent models 
seem to be less important. There is only scant evidence that physical menu costs are 
relevant for explaining rigid price adjustment. In contrast, competition seems to be 
important. Overall, the survey shows that real world price-setting behavior is more 
complex than deliberately simplified models assume. The results confirm those of 
similar previous studies. This shows that the survey approach is robust and 
complements theoretical and more econometrically-oriented analyses. 
Nicht technische Zusammenfassung 
Dieses Papier enthält die Ergebnisse einer Umfrage bei 1200 Firmen des 
Verarbeitenden Gewerbes in Deutschland bezüglich deren Preissetzungsverhaltens. 
Herausgefunden werden sollte zum einen, warum Unternehmen ihre Preise nur 
verzögert an geänderte Marktbedingungen anpassen und zum anderen, nach welchen 
Regeln sie anpassen.  
Die Umfrageergebnisse werden mit einer Reihe von Theorien über das 
Preissetzungsverhalten konfrontiert. Zudem werden die Ergebnisse mit ähnlichen 
früheren Umfragen verglichen. Wir kommen zu dem Schluss, dass einige theoretische 
Modelle die Praxis besser widerspiegeln als andere. Vergleichsweise häufig findet man 
Antworten, die mit zustandsabhängigen Modellen in Einklang stehen, während so 
genannte zeitgebundene Preissetzungsregeln seltener eine Rolle zu spielen scheinen. 
Wenig Unterstützung finden Theorien, wonach physische Menukosten wichtig sind, um 
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verzögerte Preisanpassungen zu erklären. Dagegen scheinen die 
Wettbewerbsverhältnisse der Unternehmen eine wichtige Rolle zu spielen. Insgesamt 
machen die Umfrageergebnisse deutlich, dass in der Praxis das Preissetzungsverhalten 
komplexer ist, als dies in notgedrungen vereinfachten Modellen dargestellt wird. Die 
Ergebnisse bestätigen vielfach diejenigen ähnlicher früherer Umfragen. Dies 
unterstreicht die Robustheit des Umfrageansatzes und seinen Wert als Ergänzung zu 
theoretischen und stärker ökonometrisch orientierten Ansätzen. 
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1 Introduction 
If nominal prices adjust only incompletely after monetary shocks, monetary 
policy has real effects, at least in the short run. The nature of incomplete nominal 
adjustment affects the costs of alternative disinflation strategies and may even cause 
inflation persistence. More and more micro-founded theories seeking to explain nominal 
price rigidity have evolved in the past few years, but empirical research has begun only 
recently. It proved to be difficult if not impossible to discriminate different micro-
founded macro models of price stickiness from aggregate data or even from the micro-
data collected by the National Statistical Offices. There are several explanations for 
these difficulties. At the macro level, different micro-founded models are almost 
observationally equivalent, and no official statistic contains explicit information on why 
firms do not adjust prices instantaneously. Official microdata normally do not contain 
any explanatory variables, and the samples underlying the datasets might be 
heterogeneous. This makes the empirical analysis difficult. Let us assume that there are 
two sectors and that the reasons for price rigidity differ between the two sectors. If a 
dataset does not contain any information on the sector, the outcome of a pooled analysis 
will be either that for each firm each reason of price stickiness applies to a certain extent 
or the effects may even cancel each other out, rendering both reasons statistically 
insignificant. In this vein, Blinder et al. (1998) pioneered, for the United States, the use 
of special surveys to test some of the theories of price adjustment.  
This paper presents results of such a survey on price-setting behavior among 
1200 manufacturing firms in Germany. The firms reported why they respond with a 
delay to shocks and how they adjust their prices. The study confirms Blinder et al.’s 
findings that there exists no single simple theory to explain delayed price adjustment. 
Thus, a hybrid model will be necessary to capture the features of the data adequately. 
7
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Some basic ingredients of their model are generally acceptable for Germany, too: 
Written contracts explicitly prohibit price increases for a substantial share of output, and 
many firms postpone price increases for fear that competitors will not follow suit and 
that they will lose market share. For Germany, one can add to this picture that most 
firms apply mark-up pricing, as is assumed by most of the sticky price models. 
Indexation (e.g. Christiano et al., 2005) and purely time-dependent models (Taylor, 
1980, and Calvo, 1983), i.e. models that take the point of time of a price change as 
exogenous, do not play an important role.  
Similar surveys have been conducted in the meantime for the UK (Hall et al., 
1997, 2000), Sweden (Apel et al., 2005) and Canada (Amirault et al., 2004). 
Comparable surveys have recently been administered in several euro-area countries:
1 
Fabiani et al. (2004) for Italy, Loupias and Ricart (2004) for France, Kwapil et al. 
(2004) for Austria, Aucremanne and Druant (2004) for Belgium, Hoeberichts and 
Stokman (2004) for the Netherlands and Martins (2005) for Portugal. Fabiani et al. 
(2005) summarize the results of the surveys for the euro area.  
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 starts with a description of 
the survey. Section 3 investigates how prices are set and, in particular, whether firms 
have price-setting power. Section 4 analyses factors hampering price changes and 
section 5 why firms adjust prices. Section 6 reports the results of a cluster analysis, 
which aims at identifying groups of firms with distinct reasons for price stickiness. 
Section 7 summarizes and concludes. An English translation of the questionnaire, 
including the averages of the responses, can be found in the Annex C.  
2 The survey 
The German survey on producer price-setting behavior was carried out on behalf 
of the Deutsche Bundesbank by the Ifo Institute in Munich, which sent out the 
1   In the course of 2003 and 2004 nine national central banks (NCBs) in the euro area conducted special 
surveys on firms’ pricing behavior in their respective country. This was part of a collaboration project 
called the Inflation Persistence Network (IPN), a Eurosystem research network designed to achieve a 
better understanding of inflation persistence in the euro area. These surveys were aimed at providing 
useful complementary information to the quantitative price data that are also analyzed in the research 
network.   
8
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questionnaire to the 2500 participants of its monthly business cycle survey in 
manufacturing. The enclosed letter stated that the questionnaire is part of the business 
cycle survey, enabling the matching of cross-sectional and time-series information at the 
plant level. This approach also avoided a duplication of questions which otherwise 
might have annoyed participants.  
The sample of the business cycle survey developed historically and is by 
purpose.
2 Large firms are overrepresented. Firms report for product groups, which in 
most cases coincide with plants. Most firms are single-plant firms. Larger plants may 
reply for several product groups. In these cases the largest product group was selected 
for the special survey. The name of the product group was mentioned at the beginning 
of the questionnaire. Eventually, 1200 firms or 47 per cent of all firms participated, 
mainly those that participate regularly in the business cycle survey. All descriptive 
results are weighted with post-stratification weights. The weights are the number of 
plants according to 2-digit NACE classification and size class of employees. 
The questionnaire (see Annex C) consists of two parts: “General information” and 
“Information regarding price formation”. The first part mainly concerns the market the 
firm operates in. In the second part firms are asked how they set their prices and, on a 
four-point scale, whether price setting and price reviewing follow a time-dependent or a 
state-dependent rule, whether firms behave forward or backward-looking, what causes 
price changes and what the likely reasons for a postponement of price changes are. The 
questionnaire states that the scale goes from (1)=minor importance to (4)=great 
importance. In the tables and text of the present paper, the numeric scale is translated as 
follows: (1)=not important, (2)=moderately important, (3)=important and (4)=very 
important.  
The questionnaire focuses on domestic sales prices as opposed to price setting in 
foreign markets. This turned out not to be a major problem. According to the responses 
to questions 2 and 3, domestic price setting should apply for roughly 60 per cent of 
firms and 95 per cent of sales. This astonishingly high share is partly due to exports 
                                                 
2   Germany had no register of firms before 1995; therefore, no random sampling was possible. Instead, 
researchers had to decide deliberately which firms to ask, e.g. based on published sales figures. This is 
called sampling by purpose or purposive sampling. In recent years, the sample has been updated to 
make it more representative. 
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through wholesalers. For domestic producers this is domestic demand sold at domestic 
prices.  
The survey took place in June 2004, at a time of weak growth. Following strong 
growth in 1999 and 2000, total real GDP virtually stagnated and grew in the first two 
quarters of 2004 by 2.0 per cent change over previous year after adjustment for seasonal 
and working day variations. Within industry, it was 1.5 per cent. The CPI rose by 1.4 
per cent and the PPI by 0.7.  
3 Price setting 
If all markets were perfectly competitive, prices should be perfectly flexible and 
there should be a unique equilibrium price. Therefore, all sticky price models have to 
assume some kind of market imperfection. Most models (e.g. Woodford 2003, and 
Rotemberg 1982) postulate that firms are price setters and that they apply some type of 
mark-up pricing. However, these models do not generate the inflation persistence 
diagnosed by vector autoregressions. Two ways of mitigating this problem are to let a 
fraction of firms index their prices to another price or price index (Yun 1996, and 
Christiano et al. 2005) and to assume that a fraction of firms follow a price leader with a 
lag, a form of strategic complementarity.  
Table 1: Types of price setting of firms with price-setting power 
Type of price setting  Share of firms 
Constant mark-up on calculated unit costs  4 
Taking calculated unit costs as a reference and varying the mark-up, taking 
into account market and competition conditions  
69 
Taking the price of the main competitor as a reference  17 
Tying the price to another price (e.g. wage)   2 (5) 
Other   7 (12)
Total  100 (107)
Nota bene: Values in brackets include double counts. For instance, 5% report tying their price to another 
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Most of the firms (88%) report that they do have a certain margin for setting their 
prices (question 8). Mark-up pricing
3 (73%) dominates the price setting of firms with 
market power. There are only a few firms which set their prices by applying a constant 
mark-up on calculated unit costs (4%). These firms may be price leaders, i.e. the most 
powerful firms. The largest share of firms has a time-varying mark-up (66%). They use 
calculated unit costs as reference and take market conditions and competition into 
account. The second most likely behavior of firms is to take the price of the main 
competitor as a benchmark. This is the case for 17 per cent of price setters.
4 Most of 
them may be price followers and less powerful than mark-up price setters. However, 
there may also be powerful firms in an oligopoly that have to watch their competitors 
closely. Indexation to another price is almost non-existent. 
4 Reasons for price stickiness 
This section investigates, why firms do not adjust their prices immediately after 
shocks, even if they have some market power. Since the present questionnaire was 
restricted to two pages, it includes only some of the theories asked by other euro-area 
countries. Theories that seemed a priori less important in manufacturing or had turned 
out to be of low importance in other studies were disregarded. Two examples are 
Blinder  et al.’s “Psychological Pricing Points” and “Judging Quality by Price” that 
ranked 22nd and 25th out of 27 theories in Köhler’s (1996) survey. Physical menu costs 
did not perform well in the Blinder et al. and Köhler studies either, but since this 
explanation is so prominent in the literature, it was included nonetheless. The following 
theories were eventually included. 
Nominal contracts If prices are fixed for a certain period in nominal terms by 
contract, plants can no longer react to unexpected shocks by changing prices.  
                                                 
3  The questionnaire does not specify whether firms apply the mark-up to marginal cost or to average 
cost. It is not at all clear whether firms calculate marginal cost. After all, if they fix prices for a certain 
time, the mark-up should be applied to average expected marginal costs. Further, if the mark-up is not 
constant but instead related to other factors, the distinction between marginal cost and average cost is 
probably no longer important. 
4  Though not asked, two out of three price takers answered this question, so some estimation can be 
provided for them, too. If it is assumed that those who did not answer question number 8 set their price 
differently (item 5 of question 8), then 28 per cent follow their main competitor. 
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Physical menu costs The theory of menu costs (e.g. Sheshinsky and Weiss 1977) 
assumes that price adjustment entails fixed costs. Prices will not be adjusted unless the 
foregone profit following from fixed prices exceeds the adjustment costs. The 
questionnaire focuses on a narrow definition of menu costs and mentions printing costs 
as an example.  
Coordination failure/kinked demand curve According to the theory of 
coordination failure firms hesitate to increase prices for fear that competitors will not 
follow suit and that they will therefore lose customers. There is no symmetric definition 
for price reductions. Two lines of argument exist. In the first, firms are reluctant to 
reduce prices because they fear competitors will reduce their prices too and that this 
may even trigger a price war. This reasoning is almost the same as for the theory of the 
kinked demand curve (Hall and Hitch 1939 and Sweezy 1939). The second is that firms 
follow the price reductions of competitors for fear of losing market share if they do not 
reduce their prices.  
Transitory shock If firms really optimize their prices over a longer time horizon 
and there are some costs of price adjustment, then firms should react to permanent 
shocks but not to transitory shocks.  
Sluggish costs This “theory” is taken from Apel et al. (2001). It states that c. p. 
output prices will not change if there are no permanent shocks in input costs.  
Time-dependent price setting Since time-dependent price setting implies sluggish 
adjustment even without further theory, two questions on time-dependence have been 
added in the present paper, namely whether firms change their prices predominantly at a 
specific point of time or after a certain time interval.
5 
Price elasticity of demand If the price elasticity of demand is smaller than one, in 
absolute terms, a price reduction will lower profits and therefore no firm will change its 
price. 
                                                 
5   If a firm changes its price once a year and always during the same month, say in January, the answers 
to both questions have to coincide. However, if there is an exceptional price change, say in April, then 
the firm that preferably changes its price at a fixed point of time should next change its price again in 
January, whereas a firm that preferably changes its price after a fixed time interval should next change 
its price in April of the following year. 
12
ECB
Working Paper Series No. 561
December 2005 
For transitory shocks, coordination failure and the price elasticity of demand, 
different replies were possible depending on whether prices are increased or reduced.  
On average, explicit nominal contracts were the most important reason for price 
stickiness at the plant level. One reason for this is that they are almost ubiquitous. A 
tabulation of the average importance of fixed nominal contracts by the duration of 
contracts indicates that firms do not feel hampered by short contracts but by contracts 
with a duration longer than half a year (see Table A1).  





Total mean  Rank 
Nominal fixed-term contract  -  -  2.4  1 
Coordination failure  2.6  1.9  2.2  2 
Price elasticity of demand  2.2  2.1  2.1  3 
Regular date  -  -  2.0  3 
Regular time interval  -  -  1.9  3 
Transitory shock  1.8  2.0  1.9  6 
Sluggish costs  -  -  1.8  7 
Menu costs  -  -  1.4  8 
Other 1.1  1.1 1.1  - 
Nota bene: A t-test at the level of 1 per cent does not reject the hypotheses that the means of the reasons 
with rank three are equal. 
Coordination failure achieved the second rank. With a mean score of 2.6 
compared to 1.9 it causes more upward than downward stickiness, on average. The third 
rank is shared by three theories: Price elasticity of demand, price change preferably at a 
fixed point of time and price change preferably according to a fixed time interval. A 
two-sided t-test did not reject the hypothesis of equality. Then follow transitory shocks 
and sluggish costs. However, their average importance is not much lower than that of 
the theories ranked second and third. A clear difference shows up for physical menu 
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5 Reasons for price adjustment 
While the last section focused on reasons for postponing a price change, this 
section focuses on reactions to cost and demand shocks and to price changes of 
competitors and investigates whether these reactions are symmetric or asymmetric. In 
question 16 firms had to grade several shocks on a four-point scale of importance for a 
price increase or price reduction. On the cost side, increases in labor costs were split 
into permanent and transitory increases because the face-to-face interviews revealed that 
the firms’ understanding of labor costs referred to permanent increases in hourly wages. 
They claimed that reductions in wage costs never happen. The same split for reductions 
of labor costs was prevented by space constraints. At least, lay-offs were explicitly 
mentioned in the question to improve understanding.   
The question for demand changes contains a double asymmetry. Firms are not 
only asked which importance they attach to demand increases for price increases and 
demand decreases for price reductions but also whether demand decreases are important 
for price increases or demand increases for price reductions. The second asymmetry is 
motivated by the fact that with a high share of overhead costs unit costs should decrease 
with an increase in demand and vice versa. Further, it is frequently argued that marginal 
costs are decreasing because discounts are growing in line with the quantity purchased.  
It turned out that the most important motivation for price changes is changes in 
the costs of materials (see Table 3). Their impact is larger for price rises than for price 
reductions. Labor costs matter in the event of permanent wage increases but transitory 
increases, as well as reductions of labor costs, have only a modest impact. For 
reductions of labor costs, permanent changes may likewise be more important than 
transitory changes. This could explain why the average grade for reductions lays 
between the grade for permanent and transitory increases. Financing costs are not 
important either. The pass-through is larger for increases than for reductions. An 
increase in productivity, which can be seen as a permanent cost reduction, received an 
average score of 2.4. Thus, firms are more likely to react to cost increases than to cost 
reductions. For the demand shocks, there are almost no differences in mean grades 
between the four alternatives. They range from 2.0 to 2.3. Yet it is questionable whether 
all firms understood the double dichotomy. Approximately 25 per cent attached a grade 
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of 3 or 4 to the importance of a demand decrease for a price increase as well as for a 
price reduction. On the other hand, when asked for the reasons for a price increase 
(reduction), about 10 per cent of firms assigned a high grade to a demand decrease 
(increase) and a low grade to a demand increase (decrease). These may be firms with 
high fixed costs. 
Table 3: Asymmetric reactions of price changes to shocks 
Type of shock  Price   p-values 
 Increase Reduction  Chi2  LR 
  mean score    
Increase (reduction)  of costs of materials  3.4  2.8  0.000  0.000 
Permanent increase of labor costs  
(e.g. negotiated wage increase) 
2.7 - -  - 
Transitory increase of labor costs  
(e.g. overtime hours, bonuses) 
1.5 - -  - 
Reduction of labor costs (e.g. bonuses, lay offs)  -  1.9  -  - 
Increase (reduction) of financing costs  1.9  1.6  0.000  0.000 
Increase of productivity  -  2.4  -  - 
Product  improvement  2.3 - -  - 
Demand increase (reduction) 2.2  2.3  0.000  0.000 
Demand reduction (increase)  2.2  2.0  0.000  0.000 
Price increase (reduction) by a competitor  2.1  2.6  0.000  0.000 
Other 1.9  1.8  0.894  0.887 
 
An asymmetric reaction can be observed for price changes of competitors. Firms 
react strongly to price reductions by competitors but to a lesser extent to price increases, 
in accordance with the theory of coordination failure. A chi-square test and a likelihood-
ratio test
6 reject the null hypotheses of symmetry for all reactions besides “other 
reasons”.  
A cross-tabulation of type of price setter with the importance of several reasons 
for price increases and reductions (see Table A2) confirms the results obtained in 
section 3 on price setting. Firms with a constant mark-up respond to cost changes but 
                                                 
6   The chi2 test is a generalization of the (2 x 2) McNemar test for a (r x r) contingency table (Hartung 
1989) and the likelihood-ratio test follows Bowker (1948). These tests ignore the main diagonal and 
consider only the off-diagonal elements. 
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rarely to demand changes, and are less likely than other firms to respond to competitors’ 
price reductions. Firms that take the price of their main competitor as a reference are 
more likely to react to competitors’ price changes and to demand changes than other 
firms. These firms may take not directly observable demand changes as an indication of 
price changes by their competitors. This would also explain why they are less likely to 
react to permanent wage increases than other firms. They react to permanent wage 
increases only insofar as they react to their competitors’ reaction to permanent wage 
increases. Another explanation for the stronger reaction to demand increases is that 
these firms are price followers most of the time, but occasionally have to act as price 
leaders to avoid being punished by their competitors. Thus, from time to time, they have 
to sacrifice some market share that is least detrimental to their profits at times of 
exceptional demand. Firms with a variable mark-up are caught in the middle between 
firms with a constant mark-up and firms that take the price of their main competitor as a 
reference. 
Firms with indexation raise their prices more often in response to cost increases 
than other firms do. It is irrelevant whether the costs are costs of materials, permanent 
wage increases or financing costs. In the case of cost reductions, they behave like other 
firms. Yet, indexation does not necessarily imply that prices are adjusted continuously, 
in the way macro models typically assume. Indexation may also be lump-sum.
7 This is 
obvious by indexation to wage contracts. In a face-to-face interview, a manufacturer of 
car parts reported that one of his customers usually makes a proposal for a one-time 
price adjustment if input prices have increased more than expected. 
6 Clustering of firms 
The analysis of the importance of various reasons for postponing a price change in 
section  4 yielded no dominant explanation. We will therefore need to use a more 
complicated model. One possibility may be a model with several groups of firms, each 
group facing a simple but distinct explanation for its behavior. This section reports the 
results of a cluster analysis that uses the answers to questions 16 and 17, i.e. the reasons 
for changing a price and the reasons for postponing a price change, to identify such 
groups. The analysis reveals that it is difficult to identify different homogeneous groups 
16
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of firms. Instead, firms may be grouped by increasing complexity of reasons of price 
stickiness. The results suggest that eventually an alternative model where each firm has 
many reasons, and not just one or a few, to postpone a price change would be more 
appropriate. Such a model has to be developed in the future. The following paragraphs 
present the analysis in more detail. The methodology proceeds in two steps following a 
proposal by Bacher (1994). 
The aim of the specific cluster analysis in this paper is to partition the firms into a 
distinct number of nonoverlapping clusters. In the words of Kendall (1980, p. 32), a 
cluster is “a group scattered around some central value, possibly condensing in a nuclear 
set, not necessarily spherical but not excessively elongated into a rod-like shape”. 
Within clusters, the objects should be as similar as possible, yet the distance between 
the central values of the different clusters should be as great as possible. Thus, the 
cluster analysis requests a measure of similarity or dissimilarity. In the present analysis 
we understand the distance of the object to its central value as a residual and use the 
Euclidean distance or the sum of squared residuals as dissimilarity measure, depending 
on the clustering method.
8  
As a preparation of the cluster analysis we must clarify whether the variables used 
are comparable. Variables may not be comparable because there might be some latent 
variables that are under- or overrepresented. For example, there are two variables to 
measure the importance of transitory shocks for postponing a price change, one for a 
price increase and the other for a price cut, but only one to measure the importance of 
sluggish costs. Without any correction, transitory shocks would be overrepresented in 
the analysis, which likely leads to biased central values and distances.
9 Therefore, in a 
first step, a factor analysis will be used to identify a few (latent) variables for changing a 
price or representing the reasons for postponing a price change. In a second step, for the 
                                                                                                                                               
7   Indexation needed a special permission before EMU. 
8  Someone who is not familiar with cluster analysis should think of the present cluster analysis as of 
assigning firms to groups by minimizing the within variance and maximizing the between variance. 
9   Bacher (1994), p. 154/155. E. g. to cluster people by income, it should be ensured that only one person 
per household is asked. Otherwise the income by household should be averaged, which may even 
reduce measurement error. The factor analysis is intended to determine which items belong to one and 
the same “household”. 
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cluster analysis, variables are grouped together based on the factor analyses
10 and group 
averages are used.
11 The factor analysis is presented in Appendix B. 
For clustering, we use Ward’s method and as an alternative the k-means method. 
Ward’s method is an agglomerative hierarchical clustering method. These methods start 
by considering each observation as a separate group. The closest two groups are 
combined, and this process continues until all observations belong to the same group. 
Ward’s method joins the two groups that result in the minimum increase in the error 
sum of squares. Once created, clusters are no longer dissolved in a further step of 
clustering. Although this results in a reduced statistical fit, it makes it easier to choose 
the number of clusters. In the k+1 cluster solution just one cluster of the k cluster 
solution is split into two clusters. Hence, the comparison of both outcomes is easy. 
The k-means method starts by selecting k observations as the centers of k clusters. 
Each observation is assigned to a specific cluster by minimizing the squared Euclidean 
distance. New cluster centers are calculated and the process is iterated. The method is 
non-hierarchical. Firms that have been assigned to a specific cluster in an earlier step 
can be assigned to different clusters in a more advanced step. The iteration stops if no 
observation is reallocated. Through reallocation k-means clustering allows a better 
statistical fit than Ward’s method. Hence, we use Ward’s method in a first step to 
choose the number of clusters and we use the k-means method in a second step to 
improve the assignment of the individual firms to the different clusters. 
The preferred outcome is four clusters (see Table  4). The assignment of the 
individual firms to the four clusters of Ward’s method and the k-means method 
coincides for two out of three firms. Differences occur in the assignment to the first and 




                                                 
10  Dotted lines in tables B2 and B4 distinguish the different groups. 
11  In the cluster analysis, all variables are standardized using their theoretical values for mean (2.5) and 
standard deviation (1.25). 
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Table 4: Comparison of the assignment of firms using Ward’s method and the k-
means method 
K-means   Ward    Total 
Cluster   1 2 3 4     
1   76 64  1 36    177 
2   37  178  23  3    241 
3   1 9  186  42    238 
4   33  9  36  116    194 
Total  147 260 246 197   850 
Nota bene: Figures are unweighted.  
Do these four clusters describe four distinct groups of firms where for each group 
just one reason for postponing a price change matters? The outcome is mixed. Two out 
of four clusters, the first and the second, seem to represent distinct groups in this sense 
(see Table 5). The k-means method separates these clusters even better than Ward’s 
method.  
Table 5: Average importance assigned to various reasons of price stickiness by 
cluster 
    k-means method    Ward’s method 
Cluster    1 2 3 4    1 2 3 4 
Nominal fixed-term contract    1.4  1.4  3.5 3.2   1.6  1.4  3.4 3.3 
Coordination failure (+)    2.0  2.5 2.6 2.9    2.2 2.4 2.6 2.8 
Coordination  failure  (-)    1.6 1.9 1.8 2.3    1.8 1.8 1.9 2.0 
Price elasticity of demand (+)    1.7  2.2 2.2 2.4   1.9  2.1 2.2 2.3 
Price elasticity of demand (-)    1.6  2.2 2.2 2.3   1.9  2.1 2.2 2.1 
Transitory shock (+)    1.5  2.0 1.8 2.0    1.7 1.9 1.8 1.7 
Transitory shock (-)    1.6 2.0 1.8 2.3    2.0 1.9 1.9 2.0 
Sluggish  costs    1.5 1.8 1.9 2.0    1.7 1.7 2.0 1.9 
Menu  costs    1.3 1.3 1.2 1.6    1.5 1.4 1.2 1.4 
Fixed point of time    2.2  1.4 1.4 3.1    3.1  1.4 1.5 2.4 
Fixed time interval    1.9  1.5  1.3  3.2    3.1  1.3 1.6 2.4 
Price change in advance    1.4  3.1 3.1 2.2    2.3 2.7 3.3 1.8 
Share of firms (%)    21  28  28  23    13  35  31  21 
Nota bene: Figures are weighted. Average importance figures greater than 2.0 are in boldface. 
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 •  Cluster one represents firms that do not feel much hampered in their price 
adjustment. If at all, it is because of time-dependent price setting. The share of 
these firms is smaller in the case of Ward’s method (13%) compared to the k-
means method (21%) but the firms in the second cluster of Ward’s method 
feel more hampered (3.1) than the firms in the respective k-means cluster 
(2.2). However, coordination failure plays some role in the second cluster of 
both methods.  
•  Cluster two represents firms that feel hampered by coordination failure and the 
price elasticity of demand. These firms may face a kinked demand curve. 
They change prices in advance if possible.  
•  Cluster three is similar to cluster two. However, nominal fixed-term contracts 
are very important in addition to the already important kinked demand curve. 
The firms in the third cluster feel more hampered than in the second cluster. 
However, this is not because a reason that already had an above average 
importance in the second cluster has become even more important but instead 
because a reason that was of only minor importance in the second cluster has 
now become more important.  
•  In cluster four time-dependent price setting increases the complexity further.  
Hence, a research strategy may be to start with a simple model for part of the 
firms and subsequently to increase the complexity of the model. 
7 Summary 
The survey of 1200 German manufacturing firms taken in 2004 reveals that 
almost all manufacturing firms (88%) have a certain margin for price setting. Most of 
them set their prices relative to the prices of their main competitors and apply mark-up 
pricing. This confirms the basic assumptions of widespread sticky price models. Yet 
indexation is rejected by the data.  
Asked why they postpone a price adjustment, firms attached the greatest 
importance, on average, to fixed nominal contracts, followed by coordination failure as 
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the second most likely source of price rigidity. Coordination failure results in more 
upward than downward stickiness. No one single theory can explain delayed price 
adjustment. A model has to take into account several reasons for postponing a price 
change for each firm. However, for almost 50 per cent of firms price stickiness may be 
explained by a relatively simple model whereas for the other half a quite complex model 
is necessary. 
In accordance with mark-up pricing, firms are most likely to change prices in 
response to changes in the costs of materials. Their impact is greater for price increases 
than for price reductions. Labor costs matter in the event of permanent wage increases. 
Transitory increases as well as reductions of labor costs have only a modest impact. In 
accordance with coordination failure, firms react strongly to price reductions by 
competitors but to a lesser extent to price increases. 
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Annex A  
Table A1: Importance of written contracts according to contract length 
Duration in months  Average importance  Share of firms  Average sales share, 
% 
0 1.4  13  0 
1<x<=3 2.3  18  53 
3<x<=6 2.4  19  59 
6<x<=9 2.7  1  53 
9<x<=12 2.7  45  62 
12<x 2.6  3  57 
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Table A2: Type of price-setting acco
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Annex B:  Factor analysis 
The general aim of a factor analysis is to reduce the correlation between several 
variables by a few common factors and residual factors.
12 The common factors are 
assumed to be unobservable but to correlate strongly with the observable variables. The 
factor analysis decomposes the variance of the i -th variable into two parts 
()
2 2
i i i u h X Var + = . 
2
i u  is the residual variance of the i -th variable and 
2
i h  is the so called communality. 
The communality measures the share of the i -th variable that can be attributed to the k  
common factors. In the case of standardized variables the variance is 1 and therefore  
() 1
2 2 = + = i i i u h Z Var . 
The factor analysis decomposes the correlation matrix R according to 
U L L R
T + ⋅ = . 
L is the loading matrix, calculated from the eigenvalues and –vectors of the R-matrix 
according to  
2 1 D E L ⋅ = . 
E is the matrix of the k  first eigenvectors of R and 
2 1 D  is a diagonal matrix 
containing the k  largest eigenvalues of R. U  is a diagonal matrix containing the 
residual variances of the t  variables as elements.  






ij i l u
1
2 2 ˆ 1 ˆ  and 
                                                 
12 This presentation follows Marinell (1995). 
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ij i l h
1
2 2 ˆ ˆ  
where  ij lˆ  are the elements of the loading matrix L, calculated from the eigenvalues and 
–vectors of the observed correlation matrix. 
The loading matrix L describes the relationship between variables and factors. 
The interpretation is simple if each factor is loaded highly by some variables and lowly 
by the remaining variables. To get a good interpretation of the loading matrix it can be 
transformed by an orthogonal matrix M without changing the communalities and the 
residual variances. If 
* L  denotes the transformed loading matrix then 
M L L ⋅ =
*  
and 
U L U L M M L U L L
T T T + = + ⋅ ⋅ ⋅ = + ⋅
* . 
This transformation is called factor rotation, since multiplication by an orthogonal 
matrix rotates the coordination system. After rotation, the order of the factors no longer 
has any intrinsic meaning. 
There are several ways to determine the number of retained factors. According to 
the Kaiser-criterion all factors with an eigenvalue greater than 1 are retained. An 
alternative is to determine the number of factors at that factor where a sizeable drop in 
the eigenvalue occurs. Another alternative is to specify the desired share of the total 
variance that should be explained by the factors.  
The factor analysis for the reasons of postponing a price change shows two factors 
with an eigenvalue larger than one (Table B1), where the second eigenvalue is only 
slightly larger than 1. However, the eigenvalue of the third factor (0.3) is clearly 
smaller. Thus, the Kaiser-criterion favors at most two factors. A sizeable drop in the 
eigenvalue occurs between the first and the second factor and between the second and 
the third factor, so that again at most two factors should be retained. The first factor 
already explains 73 per cent of the total variance. The two factor solution explains 
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slightly more than the total variance thereby indicating that in a two factor solution 
some variables are assigned to both factors, what is undesirable. Hence, from a formal 
point of view a one factor solution might even be preferable to the two factor solution. 
However, the interpretation of the outcome of the one factor solution is almost 
impossible and the residual variances of most variables are too large. Therefore, we 
choose two factors. 
Table B1: Eigenvalues for the factor analysis of the reasons for postponing a price 
change 
Factor Eigenvalue  Difference  Proportion  Cumulative 
1  2.5885 1.4247 0.7315 0.7315 
2  1.1638 0.8575 0.3289 1.0604 
3  0.3063 0.0210 0.0866 1.1469 
4  0.2853 0.1449 0.0806 1.2276 
… … … … … 
Total  3.53854  - - 1.0000 
Number of observations      895 
 
 
Since the second factor is easier to interpret than the first, the discussion starts 
with the second factor. It is named “time-dependence” because the variables “price 
change preferably at a specific point of time” and “price change preferably after a 
specific period of time” are assigned uniquely to this factor. A negative loading shows 
up for the variable “price change in advance if possible”. This negative sign is 
interpreted as reflecting state-dependent price setting because state-dependence is the 
opposite of time-dependence. However, this variable should not exclusively be assigned 
to the second factor since it displays a positive factor loading for the first factor that is 
not much smaller than the one for the time-dependent factor. The menu cost variable 
shows similar behavior. It loads positively with the time-dependent factor yet also 
correlates with the first factor. All the other reasons can be assigned to the first factor. 
The price elasticity of demand, transitory shocks and coordination failure are the 
variables that mainly constitute the first factor. For nominal fixed-term contracts and 
sluggish costs, the two-factor model is a poor fit.
13 There is no good catchword for the 
                                                 
13  In fact, if one allows for four factors, nominal fixed-term contracts show up as a distinct factor. 
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first factor, yet as the price elasticity of demand and coordination failure are related to 
competition, the first factor is called “competition”.  
Table B2: Factor loadings for reasons for postponing a price change 
Reason  Factor 1:  
Competition 




Regular date  0.0171  0.7092  0.5032 
Regular time interval  0.0677  0.6687  0.3517 
Foreseeable price change in advance  0.2067 -0.3351  0.1550 
Menu costs  0.2195 0.2902 0.1324 
Nominal fixed-term contract  0.2305  0.0294 0.0540 
Sluggish costs  0.3162  0.1308 0.1171 
Coordination failure (increase)  0.5222  -0.0898 0.2808 
Transitory shock (increase)  0.6208  -0.0044 0.3854 
Price elasticity of demand (increase)  0.6531  0.0083 0.4265 
Coordination failure (decrease)  0.5669  0.0873 0.2290 
Transitory shock (decrease)  0.6430  0.0896 0.4215 
Price elasticity of demand (decrease)  0.7029  0.0403 0.4957 
Nota bene: The table displays the rotated (principal) factors. Loadings of items that are designated to a 
specific factor are in boldface. Dotted lines distinguish groups of reasons that were used for the cluster 
analysis. 
Although two interpretable factors were identified, the exercise reveals several 
serious problems. First, the assignment of the items to the factors is not unique: physical 
menu costs are one example. Second, the communalities of several items are very low 
(see Table B2). For example, both factors explain only 1 per cent of the variance of 
sluggish costs. In other words, the number of explanations for price stickiness cannot be 
reduced to a small number of possibly latent reasons by a factor analysis. This would 
lead to a substantial loss of information. For the cluster analysis we therefore group the 
reasons for postponing a price change as indicated in Table B2 by the dotted lines. 
However, the factor analysis suggests that the question of time-dependence versus state-
dependence and the remaining reasons are two distinct issues, which is an interesting 
outcome.  
The factor analysis for the reasons for price changes again gives us two factors 
“costs” and “demand” (see Table B3 and B4). However, the fit of the model does not 
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favor the use of the factors for the data analysis in general. Their use should be 
restricted to cases where simplicity is preferable to a good fit.  
Table B3: Eigenvalues for the factor analysis of the reasons of changing a price  
Factor Eigenvalue  Difference  Proportion  Cumulative 
1  3.1315 1.3957 0.5432 0.5432 
2  1.7358 0.9232 0.3011 0.8443 
3  0.8126 0.2722 0.1410 0.9852 
4  0.5404 0.1786 0.0937 1.0790 
… … … … … 
Total  5.7649  - - 1.0000 
Number of observations      1067 
 
Table B4: Factor loadings for reasons of changing a price 
Reason  Factor 1:  
Costs 
Factor 2:  
Demand 
Communalities 
Permanent wage increase  0.5277  -0.1178 0.2923 
Temporary wage increase  0.4383  0.1744 0.2236 
Financing costs, increase  0.5499  0.1493 0.3247 
Costs for material, increase  0.3962  -0.1281 0.1733 
Wages, reduction  0.6738  0.0328 0.4551 
Financing costs, reduction  0.6646  0.1823 0.4750 
Costs of materials, reduction  0.5419  0.0124 0.2938 
Productivity increase  0.5361  0.2234 0.3373 
Demand increase (price reduction)  0.3410 0.4856 0.3520 
Demand increase (price increase)  0.0682  0.6837  0.3821 
Demand decrease (price reduction)  0.1091  0.6189  0.3949 
Demand decrease (price increase)  0.2222  0.5953  0.4037 
Price increase by competitor  -0.0930  0.5171  0.2760 
Price reduction by competitor  -0.1215  0.5013  0.2660 
Product improvement  0.1499  0.3240  0.1275 
Nota bene: The table displays the rotated (principal) factors. Loadings of items that are designated to a 










ifo Institut      / Deutsche Bundesbank
für Wirtschaftsforschung      Frankfurt am Main 
Forschungsbereich Unternehmensbefragungen 
Postfach 86 04 60  81631 München 
e-mail: umfragen@ifo.de   internet: http://www.ifo.de 
 
Telefon: (089) 9224-0  contact person: Herr Stahl  069 9566-8239 
Telefax: (089) 9224-1463  e-mail: Harald.Stahl@bundesbank.de 
                        98 53 69   
  
Special survey on the 
formation of producer prices 
 
The questions concern the product mentioned below  (in 
the sequel denoted by XY). Please mark the relevant box. 
 
Your answers are analysed strictly confidential. The 















Please refer your answers to the above mentioned product! 
 
General information 
1)  The share of XY with respect to total sales amounts to   81 % 
2)  Our customers for XY are from (share of sales) 
 
  Germany           76 % 
  other Euro-area countries        14 % 
  other countries          10 % 
      100  % 
3) Our price setting in the remaining Euro-area / other countries differs 
from our domestic market with respect to 
 other  Euro-area  other 
 countries  countries 
  to the timing    8 %  10 % 
  the amount  13 %  17 % 
  the reasons  11 %  15 % 
  It is not different  75 %  68 % 
 
Please refer your answers from now on to the domestic market, 
respectively to the whole Euro-area if the price setting there is 
not different from the domestic market! 
 
4)  The breakdown of our sales with XY  with respect to customers is 
 
  our own group             7 % 
  other  industrial  enterprises     50  % 
  wholesale      17  % 
  retail, department stores, hypermarkets,  
  mail  order  houses     12  % 
  private costumers           6 % 
  government          4  % 
  others           4  % 
5) Our sales share of XY with customers, who regularly  
ask for prices, amounts to        57 % 
6)  The number of our most important competitors for XY on the 
domestic market amounts to  
 
  less than 5      18 % 
  between 5 and 20            54 % 
  more than 20        28 % 
  We do not have any significant competitor    0 % 
 
Information regarding price formation 
7)  Our prices are revised (without being necessarily changed) 
  regularly      81  % 
    daily   6 %  weekly  4 %  monthly 10 %
  quarterly  13 %  semi-annual 13 %  yearly  21 % 
  on certain events (e.g. if costs changes are large)  54 % 
  within the scope of an ex post calculation    46 % 
 
8)  We have a certain margin for setting our price and determine it 
 
  by applying a constant mark-up on calculated unit costs   4 % 
 
  by taking calculated unit costs as reference and varying the mark-
up taking into account market and competition conditions  69 % 
  by taking the price of our main competitor as a reference   17 % 
  by tying it to another price (e.g. wage)  5 % 
  in a different manner  12 % 
 
9)  We have almost no margin for price setting  12 % 
 
10) We warrant our price on average for a period of  7.7  months. 
 
11) Our sales share of XY under written contracts that set  
prices for a stated period amounts to   60 % 
 
  These prices are tied by contract to the development 
of other variables (e.g. collectively negotiated wages)   11 % 
 
  Prices are fixed for  9  months on average. 
  
 
12) Our per unit profit is lower during a downturn  51 % 
13) Our price is constantly reduced during the life-cycle  17 % 
Please mark according to significance.  
(1)=minor importance to (4)=great importance 
14) The calculations underlying our price setting are based on 
 
    (1) (2) (3) (4) 
  extrapolating past values (e.g. average price  22  29  31  18 
increase of intermediate inputs during the  
preceding year, past cost development) 
 
  the actual development  8  15  32  45 
 
  expectations, that are not based on extrapolating  28  33  26  13 
past values (e.g. future cost increases) 
(page 1 of 2) 
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Please take into account from now on only those price changes that belong to transactions and not to pure list price changes. 
15) Our price for XY  
 
  is the same for all customers     11 %  depends on the amount bought  50 %  is decided upon case by case        62 % 
16)  Starting from a satisfying business situation we change our prices if there is an   minor               greater 
   importance      importance 
 Price  increase  (1) (2) (3) (4) 
  permanent increase in labor costs (e.g. negotiated wage increase)  15  28  33  24 
  transitory increase in labor costs (e.g. overtime hours, bonuses)  62  29  6  3 
  increase in financing costs   40 35 20 5 
  increase in costs of materials  4  7  33  56 
 product  improvement  22 39 28  10 
       demand increase  26 38 26  10 
 demand  reduction  32 32 25  11 
       price increase by a competitor   29  37  25  9 
 other  reasons  58 16  7  19 
 Price  reduction  
  decrease in labor costs (e.g. bonuses, lay offs)  44  30  18  8 
       decrease in financing costs   53  34  11  3 
       decrease in costs of materials  15  21  29  35 
       increase of productivity  17 36 36  11 
       demand increase   38 35 20 7 
  demand reduction   24 32 30  14 
  price reduction by a competitor  21  24  34  21 
       other reasons  61 14  8  17 
17)  We change our prices at a regular date if possible (e.g. beginning of the year)  51  14  19  16 
  We change our prices according to a regular time interval if possible (e.g. after 12 months)   52  17  17  15 
  We make a foreseeable price change in advance if possible   19  20  39  22 
  We postpone a price change because    
  a fixed term contract explicitly prohibits a price change  31  20  24  25 
  a price change entails high costs (e.g. printing of price lists)  71  20  8  1 
  our variable costs hardly vary during the business cycle  42  41  14  3 
  We postpone a price increase for fear that    
  competitors do not rise their prices too  20  23  35  23 
  after a short while a price reduction would be necessary  46  29  19  6 
  the hoped for additional revenues due to a higher unit price do not compensate  
for the feared losses due to a lower number of units sold  30  34  25  11 
 other  reasons  94 3 1  3 
  We postpone a price decrease for fear that    
  competitors decrease their prices too  42  31  18  9 
  after a short while a price increase would be necessary  40  31  20  9 
  the hoped for additional revenues due to a higher number of units sold do not compensate 
for the feared losses due to a lower unit price   33  31  25  10 
 other  reasons  96 3 1  1 
  
Thank you very much for your cooperation! 
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